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INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY:  






This volume is the eleventh annual volume of the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) Innovation Policy and the Economy (IPE) group.  The appreciation of the importance of 
innovation to the economy has increased over the past decade.  There is an active debate 
regarding the implications of rapid technological change for economic policy and the appropriate 
policies and programs regarding research, innovation, and the commercialization of new 
technology.  This debate has only intensified as policymakers focus on new sources of 
innovation and growth in light of the economic downturn and the arrival of a new administration. 
 
The IPE group seeks to provide an accessible forum to bring the work of leading academic 
researchers to an audience of policymakers and those interested in the interaction between public 
policy and innovation.  Our goals are: 
 
  to provide an ongoing forum for the presentation of research on the impact of public policy 
on the innovative process; 
  to stimulate such research by exposing potentially interested researchers to the issues that 
policymakers consider important; 
  to increase the awareness of policymakers (and the public policy community more generally) 
concerning contemporary research in economics and the other social sciences that usefully 
informs the evaluation of current or prospective proposals relating to innovation policy. 
 
This volume contains revised versions of the papers presented in the group’s meeting in 
Washington, DC, in April 2010.  
 
The first two chapters of this year’s volume examine innovation in two industries of particular 
interest: health care and cleantech. In different ways, they explore the unique challenges that 
innovation in these areas pose and the implications for public policy. 
 
In the essay, “Where are the Health Care Entrepreneurs?,” David Cutler begins with an 
inconvertible observation: that managing ever-rising health care costs is a critical challenge to 
American policymakers. Rising medical costs have led to—and will continue to, unless 
checked— much of the dramatic rise in federal and state budget deficits, as well as to distortions 
in private sector employment. While some of these costs may be due to beneficial innovations, a 
considerable body of evidence suggests that there is an enormous amount of inefficiency in the 
U.S. healthcare system, totaling over $700 billion of excess spending annually. 
 
The paper seeks to understand why this inefficiency has persisted. The problems of the medical 
system—such as inadequate coordination of care and poorly designed systems—are well 
understood. Why haven’t the rapid progress in cost reduction and quality control associated with firms like Wal-Mart and (until recently) Toyota been mirrored here? Put another way, where is 
the new firm that could transform healthcare like Amazon did book selling or Expedia travel? 
 
Cutler argues that there are two fundamental barriers that have deterred entrepreneurs who might 
transform the health care system. First, there is a lack of good information on quality.  
Thus, the gains that a truly innovative entity which developed a superior product could enjoy are 
very limited. Second, the way in which public insurance plans reward doctors and hospitals is 
very troubled. In most industries, higher quality is associated with higher prices. That is not true 
in medical care, largely because the largest buyer of health care services by far, the federal 
government, pays on the basis of volume, not value. As a result, inefficient care is the natural 
outcome. The essay discusses how the recent reform legislation dealt with these issues and other 
approaches to addressing them. 
 
Suzanne Scotchmer focuses on the energy sector, and in particular, the challenge of encouraging 
the development of new technologies that can reduce carbon emissions that may lead to global 
warning. A wide variety of mechanisms have been proposed to discourage carbon emissions, 
with much attention being devoted to concept of a “cap”—the issuance of a fixed number 
tradable allowances that give firms the right to emit a certain amount of carbon—and the 
imposition of a tax on carbon emissions. This paper explores on what these mechanisms for 
innovation are. 
 
Scotchmer points out that there are really two goals behind these policies.  Regardless of which 
type of regulation is chosen, such as an emissions tax or a carbon cap, the policy must perform 
two tasks. One task is to encourage innovation: the development of future generations of 
technologies. In the short run, however, regulators must ensure that efficient choices regarding 
the energy which is consumed today: energy should be produced at the lowest cost (taking into 
account the price that the user pays and the broader impacts on society). Moreover, the price of 
energy should be equal to the (marginal) cost of producing it, again considering the broader 
impact on society. 
 
The paper argues that the effects of a cap-and-trade system and a carbon tax are not the same. If 
demand for energy is relatively fixed (i.e., not price sensitive), a carbon tax will create greater 
incentives for firms to innovate. In particular, if a new, more efficient technology is invented 
under a cap-and-trade system, an excess supply of allowances can result. The price of allowances 
falls, leading to more production of energy at a lower price. As a result, the fall in the price of 
allowances reduces power generators' willingness to adopt the new innovation. (Indeed, the 
inventor may not even wish to make the new technology widely available in order to keep up 
prices.) As a result, the new technology may not be broadly adopted, leading to an inefficient 
outcome. In many cases, a carbon tax willl generate more incentives to innovate. 
 
In the third essay, Joshua Gans reconsiders the relationship between antitrust and innovation.  
Building on earlier research published in the Innovation Policy and the Economy series (Evans 
and Schmalensee, 2002; Katz and Shelanski, 2005; Gilbert, 2006), Gans focuses on the antitrust 
policy in markets where competition is not “in the market” but “for the market.”  When a single 
firm can dominate a market at a point in time (but may be displaced by entrant innovators over 
time), it is important to consider the dynamic consequences of antitrust policy:  a policy which reduces the ability of a current monopolist to deter a potential entrant may also reduce the 
innovation incentives of the entrant (and so perhaps reduce the overall rate of industry 
innovation).  Gans narrows the analysis by analyzing whether the criteria used to identify 
anticompetitive conduct based on static analysis – for example, below-cost pricing, exclusionary 
long-term contracts, and certain types of tying arrangements – is undermined or enhanced when 
one incorporates dynamic considerations.   
 
His analysis covers two important cases.  First, building on a formal framework developed in 
Segal and Whinston (2008), Gans shows that allowing certain types of behavior that reduce the 
ability of a potential entrant to compete with an established incumbent ultimately have the effect 
of reducing the level of industry innovation.  Since the benefits of earning profits (as an entrant) 
are in the near-term, while the costs of a more restrictive antitrust policy are borne at the end of 
the firm’s life as a monopolist, the present value of the near-term costs outweigh the present 
value of the long-term benefits, thus depressing innovation incentives.  In other words, when 
considering the impact of policies designed to enhance the ability of entrants to compete in the 
market, dynamic considerations reinforces the logic underlying static analysis. 
 
Gans then examines an environment where potential entrants also have the option of licensing to 
(or being acquired by) the established firm.  The option of licensing or acquisition makes 
antitrust analysis more subtle.  Notably, antitrust policy that impacts the ability of a potential 
entrant to compete shapes the outside options of both entrant and incumbent in the context of 
negotiations. The ultimate impact of antitrust policy thus depends on how these shifts in 
bargaining position affect the licensing or acquisition price (and thus the potential returns to 
entrant innovation).  Gans shows that the dynamic impact of some policies (e.g., those that 
disallow exclusive long-term contracts) complement the static analysis, while the dynamic 
impact of other policies is more ambiguous.  More generally, the essay illustrates the potential 
for sophisticated antitrust analysis that directly accounts for the dynamic impact of antitrust 
policy on innovation incentives. 
 
Raymond Fisman and Eric Werker shift the analysis to consider broader macroeconomic issues 
in their evaluation of innovations in governance.  Motivated by striking differences in institutions 
across countries (e.g., in the extent of the rule of law) and the linkage between institutional 
quality and economic prosperity, Fisman and Werker examine the types of innovations and 
conditions that promote the adoption of rules and institutions that encourage investment and 
economic growth.  They are particularly interested in cases of reform, where policymakers have 
proactively attempted to enhance the efficacy of rules and institutions.  They examine a range of 
diverse cases, including innovations in governance emerging from within the system, arising 
from events external to the system, and those involving attempts at wholesale governance 
change.    
 
Their analysis then synthesizes these cases to identify the key factors associated with growth-
enhancing innovations of governance In particular, they highlight the importance of competition 
(among jurisdictions), information (providing knowledge that enhances the ability to advocate 
for governance innovations), trade in institutions (allowing institutions effective in one location 
to be used in others), and shifting culture (which shifts informal norms in order to build on novel 
innovations in governance).  Fisman and Werker then use their framework to consider a recent wave of proposals by economists and others to promote innovations and governance. Their 
analysis suggests that the likely success of such efforts depends on the ability (and incentives) of 
policymakers to implement these proposals in a way that promotes economic investment and 
growth. 
 
In the final essay, Ben Jones considers the impact of the changing nature of scientific research 
and technological innovation on science policy.  Jones is motivated by the dynamic nature of 
scientific research – as science progresses over time, the investment required by young 
researchers to reach the “frontier” of science increases.  The direct effect of the “burden of 
knowledge” is to increase the time required to become an innovator, and Jones presents striking 
evidence that there is an upward shift over time in the age distribution of discovery and 
innovation.  Researchers can attempt to overcome the burden of knowledge in several ways, 
most notably by increasing their level of specialization (i.e., developing mastery over a narrower 
range of knowledge) which in turns increases the returns to collaboration and teamwork.   
 
Jones then considers the impact of the changing nature of science on science policy, focusing on 
three central issues:  (a) maintaining incentives to enter scientific careers even as the training 
phase extends, (b) ensuring effective evaluation of ideas as evaluator expertise narrows, and (c) 
providing appropriate effort incentives as scientists increasingly work in teams.   Jones considers 
the potential impact of alternative policies (across a range of institutions) to address these issues.  
For example, while the individualistic nature of traditional science prizes (such as the Nobel 
Prize) may have been particularly appropriate when most scientific research was solo-authored, 
now team-based science is both more prevalent and impactful.  Should the rules and design of 
the Nobel Prize be changed to adapt to these changes in the structure of scientific research?   
 
Together, these essays continue to highlight the important of economic theory and empirical 
analysis in innovation policy analysis.  While the issues involved are undoubtedly difficult, the 
chapters in this year’s volume suggest that contemporary research in economics informs the 
evaluation of current and prospective innovation policy alternatives. 